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1 Introduction
This last decade economists have made important progress in developing rational mod-
els of herding and cascades that aim at explaining outcomes that at first glance appear
anomalous. The seminal model of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) (BHW
henceforth) assumes that an investment opportunity is available to a series of investors
at a fixed price. They show that rational investors can engage in imitative behavior
leading to informational inefficiency, that is the failure in the aggregation of investors’
private information regarding the quality of the investment.1 BHW pioneered an im-
pressive wealth of papers that helps us understand the basis for uniformity of behavior,
informational cascades and inefficient outcomes. However, this literature2 shares a par-
ticular feature with BHW : The models do not allow for a price system.
This assumption is crucial, as shown by classic results in sequential trade literature3.
If prices are endogenous, then in the long run they will incorporate all available private
information leading to full social learning. In these models, a price system leads to
informational efficiency even when tradable quantities are restricted to being discrete,
and private information is bounded, that are two typical assumption required to obtain
informational cascade in the herding literature. Thus, at a first glance, results of herd
behavior cannot be directly extended to markets where price is endogenously fixed.
This is what Chari and Kehoe (2004) call the “price critique” to herding models.
In this paper we explore the relation between endogenous price formation and social
learning further. To this purpose, we generalize a standard sequential trade model in
the Glosten Milgrom (1985) style. Our main finding is that endogenous prices cannot
fully incorporate private information if the following three conditions coexist. First,
the investors’ set of actions is discrete, second, dealers and investors differ in risk
aversion, third, investors’ information is bounded. In this instance full social learning
is impossible even when transactions occur at market clearing prices.
Our paper belongs to the recent literature that attempts to adapt the studies on
“herd behavior” to markets where the prices are endogenously determined. This lit-
erature focuses on the existence of informational cascades, being situations where the
actions of informed agents cease to be informative for an observer. Cascades with
endogenous prices have been studied by Chari and Kehoe (2004), Avery and Zemsky
(1998), and Lee (1998), Cipriani and Guarino (2003). Chari and Kehoe (2004) study
a situation where each investor is endowed with a risky project that requires them to
exert a fixed amount of effort to become viable. Moreover, investors have the opportu-
nity to buy one additional project or to sell the project they hold. These trades occur
at market clearing prices. Thus, investors’ decisions have two dimensions. On the one
hand, they choose whether or not to “invest” effort in their project, and on the other
hand, they have to make a trading decision on the project’s market. Chari and Kehoe
show that past market trading can trigger a cascade on the “investment” choice. For
example, as soon as the information provided by the trading activity in the market is
positive enough, it becomes optimal for all investors to invest the fixed effort cost in or-
1An analogous result is also obtained independently by Banerjee (1992)
2See for instance Chamley (2004) for an extensive study on rational herding.
3See O’Hara (1995) for a review of financial microstructure models.
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der to make their projects viable, thus an investment cascade. However in their model,
market cascades are impossible, i.e., informational cascades in the trading action never
occur. In fact, once all projects have been undertaken, market activity would continue
to provide information on the value of the project. Thus, nothing prevents endogenous
prices from eventually incorporating all private information dispersed in the economy.
Although Chari and Kehoe’s (2004) result is useful to explain how herding in invest-
ment at fixed cost starts, in our opinion, it does not completely overturn the “price
critique” regarding trade herding and long run social learning. Namely, they state that
an informational cascade would not occur in a model without the investment decision,
i.e., when agents only have to take the trade decision. In our model, contrary to Chari
and Kehoe (2004), there is no investment dimension. Investors’s decisions only regard
trades that occur at endogenous prices, nevertheless full social learning is impossible
and informational cascades can occur. Avery and Zemsky (1998) (hereafter simply
AZ) introduce multidimensional uncertainty in a Glosten and Milgrom (1985) style
model and show that in the short run imitative behaviors can occur. Nevertheless, in
the long run these phenomena vanish and all private information is incorporated into
prices. Thus, in their model informational cascades cannot occur and prices eventually
incorporate all information available in the economy. Informational cascades in the
presence of endogenous prices are obtained by Lee (1998). He introduces an exoge-
nous transaction cost and shows that when profits from trading are smaller than the
transaction costs, traders stop trading and the flow of information stops. However, in
his model cascades are impossible in the absence of trading cost. Differently from Lee
(1998), we do not need to assume any exogenous trading costs to derive our result.
Closer to our analysis, Cipriani and Guarino (2003) obtains informational cascades in
a Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model. They assume that the traders’ valuation for the
risky asset is equal to the expected fundamental value of the asset multiplied by an
exogenous term stemming for gain (or loss) to trade. However the nature of this linear
scaling valuation is unclear. In our model agents are fully rational but differ in their
risk aversion and in their initial endowments. Furthermore, contrary to Cipriani and
Guarino (2003) agents are not restricted to trade one unit of the asset but are allowed
to exchange any integer amount of it.
More precisely, we consider a sequential trade model similar to Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) and Glosten (1989): in each period risk averse investors choose the amount of
their trade on a quantity grid. Then, risk neutral dealers quote a price at which they
clear investors’ demand. Note that a risk averse investor that is privately informed
trades for two reasons. On the one hand, he wants to exploit his private information
on the intrinsic quality of the traded item. On the other hand, he trades for risk
hedging, or in other words to smooth consumption across states of the nature. The
latter follows from investor’s risk aversion and is not directly related to the quality of
the item. Intuitively, our result can be explained as follows. Suppose that past history
of trades generates enough consensus about fundamentals, that is to say that agent’s
beliefs do not differ too sharply; then an investor’s belief will only be slightly affected
by a bounded private signal. Thus, as an investor can demand only discrete quantities
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of the asset, a small change in his beliefs will not affect his demand4. As a consequence,
all investors will eventually only trade to hedge. From this point on, the flow of trades
will no longer be informative on fundamentals and the social learning process stops.
Moreover, as trading prices correspond to the expected value of the item’s fundamentals
given the history of trades, trading price will never converge to the true fundamentals.
If the learning process stops when public expectation is wrong, then there will be large,
steady discrepancy between the price and the actual fundamentals, (the informational
cascade is in the wrong direction), and consequently the long term pricing error will
be significant.5
It is interesting to compare our result to those in market microstructure literature,
where many papers have separately considered the discrepancies in risk aversion and
discrete trading. None of these papers found cascades or long run informational in-
efficiency, and this independently from the boundedness of private information. For
instance, in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), in Easley and O’Hara (1992) and in Avery and
Zemsky (1998) the set of actions is discrete, but market makers and informed investors
are both risk neutral. As a consequence, prices eventually converge to fundamentals.
This shows that if market participants are risk neutral, then market imperfection, due
to discreteness of trade, would not be sufficient to generate long run market inefficiency.
On the other hand, risk aversion alone is not enough to generate market inefficiency as
shown by Glosten (1989), Vives (1995) and Biais et al. (2000). In these models, risk
neutral agents make a market for risk averse informed traders, but agents can trade a
continuum of quantities, and for this reason the order flow is always informative. Thus,
our contribution to this literature is to show that the coexistence of a grid for tradable
quantities along with a discrepancy in risk aversion leads to informational inefficiency.
In other words, the efficiency result of standard microstructure literature is not robust.
In Section 2 we present the model. Section 3 shows the main result. Section 4 gives
an example. Section 5 concludes. The proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
In the following we will refer to the market for a generic asset, however the model
is general enough to fit markets for investment projects, commodities and financial
assets. We consider an infinite horizon economy with periods denoted t = 0, 1, ...
where investors and dealers mutually exchange an asset. We denote by v = V+²
the fundamental value of the asset where V is a random variable that takes value in
the compact set Ω ⊂ R+ with generalized probability density function6 (abbreviated
4A similar intuition drives the result of Lee (1993) who shows the existence of wrong informational
cascades in a generalized BHW’s setting. The crucial difference with our study is that we allow for a
price system.
5The long term pricing error can be measured with the distance between the trading prices in the
long run and the expected value of the asset for someone who has the combined knowledge of all
agents in the economy.
6Throughout the paper we consider generalized probability density functions (g.p.d.f). A g.p.d.f
designates a distribution that can be either discrete either absolutely continuous. We use here the
terminology of DeGroot (1970) page 19.
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g.p.d.f) µV(.). The random variable ² admits a g.p.d.f that satisfies E[²|V ] = 0 and
V ar[²|V ] > 0 for all V ∈ Ω. Thus, E[V] is an unbiased estimator of v. We assume that
aggregating all private information dispersed in the economy discloses the realization
of V but not that of ². One can interpret V as a realized shock for which agents
are asymmetrically informed, whereas ² can be seen as shocks on fundamentals for
which realization is unknown to everybody. This reflects many situations in the real
world, think for example of the asset being a capital market instrument where private
information regards cash-flows paid in the short run, but not the cash-flows that will
be paid in the long run. Similarly, if the asset is interpreted as a productive project, V
could represent the project’s intrinsic quality that only partially affects the project’s
actual cash flows. In Section 4 we show that the presence of the noisy component ² is
not crucial to obtain our result. We restrict the tradable quantities of the asset to the
set Z of integer amounts. Markets are discrete in nature, and we think that in many
cases it is reasonable to assume that only integer quantities can be exchanged.
Agents. There is an infinity of risk averse investors and risk neutral dealers. An
investor’s expected utility obtained from an amount X of the asset and M of cash
is E[u(M + Xv)] where u : R → R is increasing and strictly concave. Apart from
this assumption, investors can differ in their utility functions u and in their initial
endowment of asset and cash, which we will denote x and m respectively. Thus, the
triple θ = (u, x,m) identifies the investor’s type and it is privately known by the
investor. We denote with Θ the set of all possible investor’ types and we assume that
the number of possible types is finite, that (x,m) is bounded for all types and that
x ∈ Z. We will refer to x as the investor’s inventory.
Trading mechanism. Trading occurs sequentially. At the beginning of each period
an investor receives a private signal s and comes to the market. He announces the
quantity Q ∈ Z of the asset he wants to trade and dealers compete in price to satisfy
the investor’s demand. We assume that investors leave the market after they have had
the opportunity to trade. The probability that the investor arriving at time t is of type
θ is exogenous, orthogonal to v and constant across time.
Information structure. Each investor receives a partially informative private signal
s that takes value in a compact set Σ and is independently distributed from his type θ.
Conditional on the realization of V, private signals are i.i.d. according to the g.p.d.f
µs|V(.|.) that satisfies 0 < pi ≤ µs|V(s|V ) ≤ pi for all V ∈ Ω and s ∈ Σ, where pi and pi
are finite constants. That means that private signals are not perfectly informative as
each realization of the signal is compatible with all realizations of V. We assume that
the distribution of s only depends on the realization of V, and that by aggregating
all private signals in the economy it is possible to know the actual realization of V.
We denote Ht the history of trades (quantities and prices) up to time t − 1. All the
agents observe Ht but they do not know the types and signals of past investors. Last,
µ²|V(.|.), the conditional g.p.d.f of the shock ² given V is assumed to be independent
of the signal s and of history Ht.
Agents’ behavior and equilibrium concept. We denote with P˜t(Q) the unit price
at which the investor arriving at time t expects to trade a quantity Q ∈ Z, with the
convention that a positive Q corresponds to a buy order. Thus, an investor of type
θ = (u, x,m) who received the signal s ∈ Σ and expects a price function P˜t(.) : Z→ R
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will demand the quantity
Q∗(θ, P˜t, Ht, s) = argmax
Q∈Z
E
[
u
(
m+ (x+Q)v − P˜t(Q)Q
)
|Ht, s
]
.
Apart from the discreteness in the tradable quantities, competition among an infin-
ity of risk neutral dealers is modelled as in Glosten (1989), Kyle (1985). At any given
period t the price competition among risk neutral dealers will lead their expected profits
to zero. Thus the price Pt(Q) at which a trade of size Q is executed must satisfy
−Q
(
E[v|Ht, Q∗(θ, P˜t, Ht, s) = Q]− Pt(Q)
)
= 0.
An equilibrium in trading period t is a price function P ∗t : Z→ R such that: (i) period-
t-investor correctly anticipates the prices at which quantities in Z will be traded; (ii)
dealers expected profit from trading any given quantity is zero. Formally, ∀Q ∈ Z,
P ∗t (Q) = E[v|Ht, Q∗(θ, P ∗t , Ht, s) = Q]. (1)
That is, in period t the market clearing price is equal to the expectation of v conditional
on the information provided by past and current trades.
3 Informational cascades and inefficiency
In the long run social learning is complete if the observation of the investors’ actions
eventually gather all the information that is dispersed in the economy. As in our model
private information only regards V, learning can only regard the realization of V.
Definition 1: Learning is said to be complete only if the random variable (E[V|Ht])t≥0
converges to V almost surely when t tends to infinity.
Note that complete learning is also characterized by the equality7 lim
t→∞
V ar[V|Ht] =
lim
t→∞
E[(V − E[V|Ht])2|Ht] = 0. Note also that from E[²|V] = 0 and equation (1),
it follows that complete learning occurs only if the trading prices eventually converge
to the realization of V. Thus complete learning coincides with market strong-form
informational efficiency.
An opposite case is when an informational cascade occurs, i.e., nothing can be
deduced from the investor’s actions because all investors take actions that do not
change with their private signal. It is useful to provide a definition of non-informative
trade:
Definition 2: An investor of type θ is said to make a non-informative trade at
time t, if the quantity he demands is not affected by his private signal, i.e., for all signal
s and s′ in Σ, we have
Q∗(θ, P ∗t , Ht, s) = Q
∗(θ, P ∗t , Ht, s
′).
7This follows from a standard result of convergence for martingales (see for instance Durrett (1996)
pages 252-253).
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According to this definition, an investor’s trade is non-informative when the obser-
vation of his trade and the knowledge of his type θ provides no information regarding
the realization of his private signal.
If for all types θ ∈ Θ, type-θ investor makes non-informative trade, then all in-
vestor’s action will be independent of their private information and the observation
of trades will not provide any additional information regarding V. Consequently, an
informational cascade occurs and complete learning is impossible. In the following,
we show that an informational cascade necessarily happens as soon as there is enough
agreement on the asset’s fundamentals, i.e., V ar[V|Ht] is sufficiently small. In order
to understand why investors’ orders eventually cease to be informative, note first that
as signals are not perfectly informative about V, the impact of private information
on investor’s choice decreases as V ar[V|Ht] approaches 0. In other words, if investors
are quite sure about the realization of V, a partially informative private signal will
have little impact on their beliefs. Now, as investors are risk averse and in addition
can demand only discrete quantities of the asset, a small change in their belief will
in general not be sufficient to affect their demand and so, for any given θ ∈ Θ, we
will have Q∗(θ, P,Ht, s) = Q∗(θ, P,Ht, s′) for all s, s′ ∈ Σ. In this instance the flow of
trade is not informative anymore and an informational cascade happens. The following
Theorem states this result formally:
Theorem 1 There exist η > 0 such that if V ar(V|Ht) < η, then in all trading periods
τ ≥ t the equilibrium is unique and such that:
(i) The price schedule satisfies P ∗τ (Q) = E[V|Ht] for all Q ∈ Z.
(ii) An investor with inventory x will trade exactly −x no matter the signal he
received.
Theorem 1 characterizes the unique equilibrium for V ar[V|Ht] sufficiently small.
Considering that signals are not perfectly informative, no single order can fully reveal
V and so full social learning cannot occur in a finite number of steps. Therefore
only two outcomes are possible. First, V ar[V|Ht] remains larger than the threshold η
and heterogeneity of types leads to what Smith and Sørensen (2000) call confounded
learning, i.e. a situation where history offers no decisive lesson for anyone and full
social learning is never reached. Second, V ar[V|Ht] is eventually smaller than η but
strictly positive, and so Theorem 1 implies that the flow of trade ceases to provide
information and an informational cascade starts. The latter situation does not rely on
heterogeneity of investors’ type, but rather on their risk aversion. In both outcomes
the conditional variance V ar[V|Ht] remains bounded away from zero and therefore we
can conclude that E[V|Ht] will remain bounded away from V with probability 1.
Note that in our set-up an informational cascade implies uniformity of actions,
or herd-like behavior, among investors of the same type but not necessarily among
investors of different types. In fact, in the presence of an informational cascade, two
traders will choose different actions provided they differ in their inventory. In addition,
Theorem 1 states that as soon as V ar[V|Ht] is small, the equilibrium price schedule
must be Pτ (Q) = E[V|Ht] for all tradable quantities and all following periods τ ≥ t.
Thus endogenous trading prices cannot incorporate all private relevant information
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even in the long run. Interestingly, if the cascade occurs when market beliefs are
substantially wrong, the difference between the true realization of V and the long term
equilibrium price E[V|Ht] will be sizable.
Note finally that there are simple empirical tests to detect informational cascade
in markets. The model predicts that in the presence of an informational cascade, the
price reaction to the volume of trade should be significantly smaller compared to a
situation where traders’ orders are informative. In other words, the deepness of the
market, measured as the quantity of assets that one can trade without affecting the
trading price, should be significantly larger when an informational cascade occurs.
4 Example
In order to understand to what extent the different assumptions in the model are nec-
essary to obtain our result, we study the case where traders have negative exponential
utility function with the same risk aversion coefficient γ. We assume that ² is nor-
mally distributed, that Ω = {V1, V2} with V1 < V2 denoting Pr(V = V2|Ht) = µt, and
that Σ = {l, h} with Pr(s = l|V1) = Pr(s = h|V2) = pi ∈ (1/2, 1). In this framework
V ar(V|Ht) = µt(1−µt)(V2−V1)2 is small for µt close to 1 or close to 0. The following
Proposition characterizes the belief thresholds µ and µ beyond which an informational
cascade will occur.
Proposition 1 Let µ (resp. µ) be the minimum µ > 1/2 (resp. maximum µ < 1/2)
such that the following two expressions are satisfied
e−γ(µV2+(1−µ)V1+γσ
2
² /2) ≤ µhe−γV2 + (1− µh)e−γV1 , (2)
eγ(µV2+(1−µ)V1−γσ
2
² /2) ≤ µleγV2 + (1− µl)eγV1 , (3)
where µh = µpi/ (µpi + (1− µ)(1− pi)) and µl = µ(1 − pi)/ (µ(1− pi) + (1− µ)pi). An
informational cascade occurs as soon as µt < µ or µt > µ.
Note first that if pi is close to 0.5, the information content of signals is low and
thus µh is close to µl. In this instance, because of the convexity of the exponential
function, inequalities (2) and (3) will be satisfied even if σ² is arbitrarily small. This
suggests that the presence of the additional noise ² is not a necessary condition to obtain
informational inefficiency. Thus, even if the aggregation of all private information could
virtually resolve uncertainty completely, when investors have imprecise signals they will
neglect their information and trade only for hedging. This will impede the convergence
of prices to fundamental.
Note also that if γ is sufficiently large, then inequalities (2) and (3) will be met at all
levels of the beliefs µ and thus independently on the precision of private signals8. This
happens because when investors are sufficiently risk averse, they only trade to reduce
the risk of their portfolio even if they have perfect information on V. Consequently
the informational content of their order vanishes.
8Indeed, an increase in γ increases the convexity of the exponential. Moreover, a sufficiently large
increase in γ reduces the left hand sides of expressions (2) and (3) more than the right hand sides.
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Finally, notice that for σ² sufficiently large the two inequalities are satisfied no
matter what the level of public belief or the information content of the private signal.
This means that if the uncertainty coming from the noise ² is sufficiently large with
respect to the information provided by the component V, then even signals that are
perfectly informative about V will not be reflected in traders’ orders. Indeed, the asset
will be too risky to be held even by investors that are perfectly informed about one
component of the asset’s fundamental value.
To sum up, when i) the investors’ risk aversion is high; or ii) the precision of private
signals is low; or iii) the volatility in the asset fundamentals is mostly due to shocks for
which there is no information, then even an infinite sequence of trades will not allow
the market to aggregate the relevant private information dispersed among investors.
5 Conclusion
We studied the possibility of informational inefficiency and cascades in markets where
trades occur at market clearing prices. We show that as soon as agents’ beliefs do
not differ too sharply, an informational cascade occurs and the price mechanism fails
to aggregate all remaining relevant private information dispersed in the economy. This
result is obtained assuming that agents can trade integer amounts and that risk-neutral
dealers make a market for risk averse investors that have bounded private information.
In a simplified model, De´camps and Lovo (2002) show that informational cascades and
long term mispricing can also occur when investors are risk neutral and dealers are
risk averse. This suggests that what leads to inefficiency is not the absence of risk
neutral investors but the absence of investors whose utility functions are identical to
those of dealers. The comparison of our result with those of other papers on sequential
discrete trading with endogenous price, suggests that market clearing prices lead to full
social learning only under very specific conditions. Namely, prices should be fixed in
a way that some investors are always willing to follow their private signal, no matter
how small the information provided by this signal. This is not the case when market
makers and investors differ in their risk aversion.
6 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1:
Take an investor of type θ = (u, x,m) with private signal s who expects a price
function P˜t. After observing history Ht his demand is
Q∗(θ, P˜t, Ht, s) = argmax
Q∈Z
E
[
U
(
Q, P˜t(Q),v
)
|Ht, s
]
,
where, to simplify notation, we defined U(Q,P,v) := u (m+ (x+Q)v −QP ). Theo-
rem 1 will be deduced from the following Proposition.
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Proposition 2 There exists ηθ > 0 such that if V ar(V|Ht) < ηθ then, in any equilib-
rium the type-θ investor will demand to trade exactly −x no matter the realization of
his private signal.
Throughout the proof, given two random variables y and z, we will use the notation
µy|z(.) to denote the g.p.d.f of random variable y given the realization of random
variable z. The proof of our proposition goes through a series of steps. The first is
to remark that in the extreme case where the private signal s provides no information
and the investor expects to trade all quantities at unit price exactly equal to E[V|Ht]
then, his demand will indeed be exactly −x. This follows directly from risk aversion:
argmax
Q∈Z
E [U (Q,E[V|Ht],v) |Ht] = −x.
In other words, if a risk averse agent can trade a risky asset at a unit price equal to the
expected value of the risky asset, then he will optimally choose to have an unbalanced
position and he will sell his inventory x. Moreover, strict concavity of u and the fact
that only discrete quantities are tradable implies that there exists ∆ > 0 such that
E [U (−x,E[V|Ht],v) |Ht]− E [U (Q,E[V|Ht],v) |Ht] > ∆ (4)
for all Q ∈ Z− { − x}.
In a second step, consider the same investor and suppose he receives an informative
signal s. We denote thereafter λ the maximum distance between his belief and those
of an agent that has only observed the history Ht:
λ ≡ sup
V ∈Ω,s∈Σ
∣∣µV|Ht(V )− µV|s,Ht(V |s)∣∣ .
We show that if λ is sufficiently small then an agent who expects to trade any quantity
at price E[V|Ht] will demand exactly −x. More precisely we have:
Lemma 1 If λ > 0 sufficiently small, then
argmax
Q∈Z
E [U (Q,E[V|Ht],v) |Ht, s] = −x
for all s ∈ Σ, and
E [U (−x,E[V|Ht],v) |Ht, s]− E [U (Q,E[V|Ht],v) |Ht, s] > ∆s (5)
for all Q ∈ Z− { − x} and some ∆s > 0.
Proof : Fix any finite quantity and prices (Q,P ). Let
ΦQ,P ≡ max
V ∈Ω
∫
²∈R
|U(Q,P (Q), V + ²)|µ²|V(²|V )dζ(²).
Accordingly to DeGroot (1970), the differential dζ(²) indicates that the integral may
be either the integral of a probability density function or the sum of the values of
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a discrete probability function. Note that ΦQ,P is finite as u is continuous and Ω is
compact. We have
|E [U (Q,P,v) |Ht]− E [U (Q,P,v) |Ht, s]| = (6)∣∣∣∣∫
V ∈Ω
∫
²∈R
U(Q,P, V + ²)
(
µV,²|Ht(V, ²)− µV,²|s,Ht(V, ²|s)
)
dζ(²) dν(V )
∣∣∣∣ =∣∣∣∣∫
V ∈Ω
(∫
²∈R
U(Q,P, V + ²)µ²|V(²|V )dζ(²)
)(
µV|Ht(V )− µV|s,Ht(V |s)
)
dν(V )
∣∣∣∣ ≤∫
V ∈Ω
(∫
²∈R
|U(Q,P, V + ²)|µ²|V(²|V )dζ(²)
) ∣∣(µV|Ht(V )− µV|s,Ht(V |s))∣∣ dν(V ) < λ ΦQ,P ,
where the second equality comes from the fact that the distribution of ² conditional
to V is orthogonal to s and to Ht, which implies µV,²|Ht(V, ²) = µ²|V(²|V )µV|Ht(V )
and µV,²|s,Ht(V, ²|s) = µ²|V(²|V )µV|s,Ht(V |s). Again the differentials dζ(²) and dν(V )
indicate that each of the integrals may actually be either the integral of a probability
density function, or the sum of the values of a discrete probability function.
Now, take λ < ∆/Φ(1−x),E[V|Ht] where ∆ satisfies (4) then, for all s ∈ Σ, we have:
E [U (−x,E[V|Ht],v) |Ht, s] = E [U (−x,E[V|Ht],v) |Ht] > (7)
E [U (1− x,E[V|Ht],v) |Ht] + ∆ > E [U (1− x,E[V|Ht],v) |Ht, s]− λΦ(1−x),E[V|Ht] +∆
> E [U (1− x,E[V|Ht],v) |Ht, s]
where the first and second inequalities follow from (4) and (6) respectively. In the same
vein, when λ < ∆/U−1−x,E[V|Ht], we have
E [U (−x,E[V|Ht],v) |Ht, s] > E [U (−1− x,E[V|Ht],v) |Ht, s]
that together with (7) shows that −x is a local maximum. Considering that
E [U (Q,E[V|Ht],v) |Ht, s] is concave in the traded quantity Q, a local maximum will
also be a global maximum. Finally, inequality (5) follows from the strict concavity of
u and the fact that only discrete quantities are tradable.¤
The last step of the proof of Proposition 2 relies on two lemma. Lemma 2 states
that, given a prior distribution with most of the probability concentrated on a state, a
private signal will only slightly affect posterior beliefs. Lemma 3 studies the maximum
range of price function that will be adopted by the dealers.
Lemma 2 Let denote δE[V|Ht] the point mass distribution concentrated on E[V|Ht],
that is δE[V|Ht](V ) = 1 if V = E[V |Ht] and 0 otherwise. The following holds: For all
ξ > 0 there exists α > 0 such that, if for all V ∈ Ω, |µV|Ht(V )− δE[V|Ht](V )| < α then,
|µV|s,Ht(V )− δE[V|Ht](V )| < ξ.
Proof : First note that, since signals’ precision is bounded ( 0 < pi < µs|V(s|V ) < pi
for all (V, s) ∈ Ω × Σ), µV|s,Ht(V |s) =
µs|V(s|V )µV|Ht(V )∫
Ω
µs|V(s|V )µV|Ht(V ) dν(V )
is well defined for
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all (V, s) ∈ Ω× Σ. Algebraic manipulations yield then to
|µV|s,Ht(V )− δE[V|Ht](V )| ≤
µs|V(s|V )∫
Ω
µs|V(s|V )µV|Ht(V ) dν(V )
α
+
∣∣∣∣ µs|V(s|V )∫
Ω
µs|V(s|V )µV|Ht(V ) dν(V )
− 1
∣∣∣∣ δE[V |Ht](V )
≤ pi
pi
α +
∣∣∣∣ µs|V(s|V )∫
Ω
µs|V(s|V )µV|Ht(V ) dν(V )
− 1
∣∣∣∣ δE[V|Ht](V )
≤ pi
pi
α +
∣∣∣∣ µs|V(s|E[V|Ht])∫
Ω
µs|V(s|V )µV|Ht(V ) dν(V )
− 1
∣∣∣∣ . (8)
Remark now that ∫
Ω
µs|V(s|V )µV|Ht(V ) dν(V ) =
∫
Ω
µs|V(s|V )(µV|Ht(V )− δE[V |Ht](V )) dν(V ) + µs|V(s|E[V |Ht])
≤ αpiK + µs|V(s|E[V |Ht]),
where K ≡ ∫
Ω
dν(V ) is finite, since Ω is compact. It follows that:
µs|V(s|E[V|Ht])
µs|V(s|E[V|Ht]) + αpiK ≤
µs|V(s|E[V|Ht])∫
Ω
µs|V(s|V )µV|Ht(V ) dν(V )
≤ µs|V(s|E[V|Ht])
µs|V(s|E[V|Ht])− αpiK
which together with (8) implies lemma 2. ¤
Lemma 3 For any finite history Ht there exists signals st and st in the set Σ such
that in equilibrium the price function satisfies
E[V|Ht, s = st] ≤ P (Q) ≤ E[V|Ht, s = st] , ∀Q ∈ Z.
Proof : Simply remark that for any finite history Ht it is always possible to find
two signals st and st in the compact set Σ, such that
E[V|Ht, s = st] ≤ E[V|Ht, s = s] ≤ E[V|Ht, s = st], ∀s ∈ Σ. (9)
Now, note that dealers cannot infer from an investor’s order more than what the
investor knows himself, and that his inventory provides no information about V. Then,
Lemma 3 follows from equation (1).¤
We now conclude the proof of proposition 2. Notice that the lower the conditional
variance V ar(V|Ht), the more the distribution ofV|Ht is concentrated around its mean
E[V|Ht]. Then lemma 2 implies that for any choice of λ > 0 and β > 0, it is possible
to fix ηθ > 0 sufficiently small in order to have supV ∈Ω,s∈Σ |µ(V |Ht)− µ(V |Ht, s)| ≤ λ
and in addition sups∈Σ |E[V|Ht]− E[V|Ht, s]| < β. Namely one can choose λ so that
inequality (5) is met. Lemma 3 implies that dealers prices will be in the interval
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[E[V|Ht] − β,E[V|Ht] + β]. Thus by fixing a sufficiently small β > 0, expression (5)
and the continuity of u lead to
E
[
U
(
−x, P˜ (−x),v
)
|Ht, s
]
> E
[
U
(
Q, P˜ (Q),v
)
|Ht, s
]
for all Q ∈ Z− { − x}. In other words the investor optimally chooses to trade −x.¤
Theorem 1 is easily deduced from Proposition 1. Notice that by choosing η =
minθ∈Θ ηθ, we obtain that when V ar(V |Ht) < η, all investors submit non-informative
orders. Consequently, when V ar(V |Ht) is small, there exists no equilibria where in-
vestors’ orders provide information on the asset’s fundamentals. Now we prove that
the non-informative equilibrium exists for these levels of V ar(V |Ht). It is sufficient to
observe that if trades are not informative, then from equation (1) the equilibrium price
function can only be P ∗(Q) = E[v|Ht]. Thus, as soon as V ar(V |Ht) < η, the equilib-
rium is unique and satisfies P ∗(Q) = E[v|Ht] for all Q ∈ Z, and Q∗(θ, E[v|Ht], Ht, s) =
−x for all s ∈ Σ and all θ ∈ Θ. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1: As the expression E[u(m+ (x+ q)v−E[V|Ht]q)|H t, s]
is a strictly concave function in the traded quantity q ∈ R, then it will have a unique
maximum. Thus, in order to find µ (resp. µ), it is sufficient to find the minimum
µt ≥ 1/2 (resp. maximum µt ≤ 1/2) such that the investor prefers to trade −x rather
than −x− 1 or −x+ 1 for both s = h and s = l. That is to say
u(m+ E[V|Ht]x) > max{E[u (m+ v + (x− 1)E[V|Ht]) |Ht, s],
E[u (m− v + (x+ 1)E[V|Ht]) |Ht, s]} (10)
for s ∈ {h, l}. Considering that u(w) = −e−γw and that ε ↪→ N(0, σε), we have that
expression (10) is satisfied only if both inequalities in Proposition 1 are met.¤
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